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LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
 
Jason Mazzone* 
 
Margaret Tarkington’s insightful article, Freedom of Attorney-Client 
Association, makes a useful contribution to how we think about constitutional 
protections for associations. 1  While the Supreme Court has understood 
associations to promote expression and therefore has grounded the doctrine of 
associational freedom in the First Amendment’s Speech Clause, 2  Professor 
Tarkington rightly recognizes that people associate in order to get things done. In 
particular, associating with others is a principal means of pursuing political goals: 
through collective appeals to the legislature in order to produce or shape statutory 
law; by promoting shared interests within the agencies of the executive branch; 
and by banding together to file lawsuits to secure legal rights. Members of 
associations often engage in expression, but basing a freedom of association 
doctrine on the Speech Clause misses the practical effects of collective 
endeavors. Instead, as Professor Tarkington observes, the First Amendment right 
“to assemble, and to petition the Government” 3  is the more relevant 
constitutional basis for associational freedom. 
Professor Tarkington persuasively shows that once associational freedom is 
understood in terms of political action, lawyering is an important component of 
the right to associate. Lawyers frame issues in terms that resonate with legislators 
who write the laws and with the executive officials who implement it. (It is no 
accident that many professional lobbyists today are lawyers.) Lawyers, of course, 
are also indispensable to successfully pursuing a grievance in the courts. Without 
the ability to engage lawyers, many associations would be unable to pursue 
successfully their goals. 
Professor Tarkington’s analysis of the significance of lawyering to 
associational freedom is not historical. She wisely makes no claim that as of 1791 
(when the First Amendment was ratified) or 1868 (when the Fourteenth 
Amendment applied the First Amendment to the states), the Constitution was 
understood to protect lawyering as an aspect of associational freedom. Instead, 
Professor Tarkington’s account is sensibly grounded in the modern complexities 
of the government and in an understanding of the tools that are needed to access 
the levers of power within today’s vast administrative state. As Professor 
Tarkington shows, today, without access to lawyers, the benefits of associating 
together in pursuit of a common cause will often remain unrealized. 
																																																								
* © 2013 Jason Mazzone, Professor of Law & Lynn H. Murray Faculty Scholar in 
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1 Margaret Tarkington, Freedom of Attorney-Client Association, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 
1071. 
2 See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622–23 (1984) (describing freedom of 
expressive association). The Court has also recognized a constitutionally protected 
freedom of intimate association. Id. at 618–19; see also id. at 631 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (locating the protection as part of the constitutional “zone[] of privacy”). 
3 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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While Professor Tarkington succeeds in showing that associational freedom 
should reflect the important role played by lawyers, her article is less persuasive 
in setting out the precise contours of protection for the attorney-client 
relationship that should follow. Professor Tarkington’s account amply supports a 
right of a group of citizens banded together to engage counsel to assist them in 
pursuing their goals. This is not, however, how Professor Tarkington presents the 
relevant interests. Instead, Professor Tarkington casts the right at issue as less 
about laypeople accessing lawyers and more about the interests of lawyers 
themselves. Thus, she write, “freedom of association secures an attorney’s right 
to associate with others for the purpose of providing legal advice.”4 Professor 
Tarkington casts associational freedom as the right of the attorney because she 
recognizes that, in practice, lawyers do not merely help frame pre-existing 
claims. Instead, lawyers inform people about claims they did not previously 
recognize or understand. Moreover, as a long history of civil rights test litigation 
demonstrates, lawyers are often the ones with the agenda: in order to pursue it in 
the courts (and comply with rules of standing) lawyers need first to find clients 
with cognizable injuries who can serve as the vehicle for articulating a complaint. 
The problem with Professor Tarkington’s approach is that once the interests 
of lawyers predominate, it is not obvious that the constitutional right of 
association comes into play. For it is one thing in a constitutional republic to 
confer protection upon a group of like-minded citizens gathering together in 
pursuit of common interests and quite another to protect the activities of a lawyer 
seeking a client to serve as the means to the lawyer’s own ends. The latter 
scenario, having little to do with exporting Tocquevillian notions of association 
to the modern American state, requires a justification for the value of activist-
lawyers within the constitutional order.  That a client needs a lawyer does not 
lead to the conclusion that a lawyer needs the client—and that the relationship 
merits constitutional protection on this basis. Perhaps there is a relevant 
constitutional grounding for lawyer-activism but it is not easily constructed upon 
the foundations of associational freedom that have already been established and 
upon which Professor Tarkington seeks now to build. Professor Tarkington’s 
lawyer-centered approach represents a claim for a new doctrine of associational 
freedom rather than a modest extension of existing rules. 
As a new account, Professor Tarkington’s approach faces a significant 
hurdle. It runs contrary to entrenched norms governing the role that lawyers play 
within our modern political and legal system. The legal profession is based on the 
idea (whether true in practice or not) that lawyers are mouthpieces for hire. They 
defend murderers and child molesters in criminal court, they represent polluters 
and discriminators in civil cases, they press for legal reforms that benefit the few 
over the many—all with the understanding that in so doing they are acting at the 
behest of the client rather than advocating their own causes. Lawyering, we 
lawyers tell ourselves and tell the world, is a profession not a cause. In selling her 
argument for a constitutional right, Professor Tarkington is in the difficult 
position of asking the legal profession to give up the norm of the disinterested 
advocate. 
																																																								
4 Tarkington, supra note 1, at 1086. 
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A tension internal to Professor Tarkington’s lawyer-based account of 
associational freedom bears also noting. Invoking the fate of the Humanitarian 
Law Project, which was subjected to a criminal provision of the PATRIOT Act 
that barred providing “material support” to groups the government has designated 
as terrorist organizations, 5  Professor Tarkington tells courts to resist the 
temptation to infer criminal culpability on the part of a lawyer from the lawyer’s 
association with an organization that includes culpable members. “If,” Professor 
Tarkington writes, “attorneys can . . . be prohibited from associating with those 
involved in a political movement merely because a member or faction of that 
movement engages in illegal or violent conduct, then access to law or legal 
processes for the entire movement may be foreclosed.”6 In a world in which 
lawyers are just mouthpieces for their clients, that argument sounds generally 
correct. Yet in Professor Tarkington’s account, recall, the lawyer is actually the 
principal player, the client the vehicle. If lawyers are to be understood in the way 
that Professor Tarkington presents them—as seeking out, encouraging, and 
engaging clients who serve the lawyer’s own agenda—then it is arguably less 
objectionable to associate the lawyer also with the client’s proven misdeeds. One 
cannot, in other words, have things both ways: “attorney speech and advocacy” 
protected by the Constitution on one hand,7 and immunity on the ground that 
lawyers do not personally agree with the clients they represent8 on the other.   
Professor Tarkington’s achievement is to show that associational freedom 
should encompass lawyering. With that, her article should have considerable 
impact on academic and judicial accounts of associational rights. In practice, 
however, the impact is likely to come in terms of protections for the ability of 
organizations to engage counsel—the right to client-attorney association—rather 
than, as in her focus, on a right that belongs to and is exercised by attorneys. 
 
																																																								
5 See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (2010). 
6 Tarkington, supra note 1, at 1107. 
7 Id. at 1090. 
8 See id. at 1115–16. 
